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In the Supreme Court of 
The State of Utah' 
GENERAL TALKING PICTURES CORPO-
RATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
NAIDA L. HYATT, as Executrix of the 
Estate of E. H. Littlejohn, who is the same 
person as Elsie Haas Littlejohn, who is the 
same perS'~n as Elsie H. Littlejohn, and 
JAMES COCHRAN LITTLEJOHN, as ad-
ministrator with will annexed of the Estate 




[ No. 7170 
I 
j 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff upon the Judgment 
Roll from a judgm~nt entered by the District Court of Car-
bon County in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff, no cause of action~ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing 
under the laws of the State of D·eleware with its office and 
principal place of business in New York City. (J.R. p 43). 
The defendant Naida L. Hyatt is the executrix of the estate 
of E. H. Littlejohn who died on or about May 8, 1942; and 
the defendant James Cochran Littlejohn is the administra-
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tor with will annexed of the estate of William Littlejohn 
who died on or about June 14, 1944. (J.R. p 44). 
The action is upon a claim which is alleged by plaintiff 
to have been "duly presented" to the defendants in their 
representative capacities (J.R. p 2) which claim is based 
upon a written contract dated November 19, 1931, a copy 
of which contract is attached to the complaint, whereby 
the plaintiff leased to the decedents for a term of ten years 
from the date of the contract, certain patented talking-
picture apparatus designated in the contract as the "Equip-
ment", for use. only in the Lyric Theatre in Price, Utah, for 
the sum of $2,000.00 payable in installments of $500.00 
each, the last of which_ was due 60 days after the installa-
tion of the equipment in the theatre. In addition, the dece-
dents were to pay, during the term of the contract, annual 
license fees of $50 commencing with the year 1932. (J.R. 
p 4). 
The equipment was installed (J.~. p 44) and the $2,-
000.00 was paid, (J.R. p 25) but none of the $50 annual fees 
was paid. (J.R. p 45). The court found that the plaintiff 
had performed all the obligations and conditions imposed 
upon it by the agreement. (J.R. p 45). 
The contract was _found to have been executed by de-:-
fendants' testators (J.R. p 44), and it provides that "upon 
the expiration or sooner termination of this license for any 
reason whatsoever OR (emphasis added) the abandonment 
by the Exhibitor (decedents; J.R. pp 4, 45) of the Theatre 
(Lyric The-atre, Price; Utah; J.R. p 4) or his eviction there·· 
from, the Exhibitor, at its own cost and expense, spall sur-
render and deliver up possession of the E·quipme.nt to the 
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Company (Plaintiffs; J.R. p 4) at its factory ... " (J.R. pp 
6, 45-46). The decedents, and after their deaths, the de-
fendants, failed and neglected to return the equipment at 
the expiration of the "license", or at all (J.R. p 45), and 
the defendants are unable to return said equipment for the 
reason that they have no knowledge ·Of its whereabouts 
(J.R. p 45). Also, the decedents, and after their death, the 
defendants, have failed to pay any of the said $50 annual 
fees. (J.R. p 45). 
Plaintiff sued to recover the value of the equipment 
\Vhich the court found to be $3,000.00 at the commence-
ment of the action (J.R. p 45), and to recover the total of 
the annual license fees.· The action was commenced on May 
24, 1945 and the case was tried to the court without a jury 
on May 14, 1946 (J.R. p 50), and on October 27, 1947' the 
court made and filed his Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (J.R. p 49) and entered judgment in favor of de-
fendants and against the plaintiff (J.R. p 51). Motion for 
new trial was duly filed (J .R. p 54) and, on December 8, 
1947, the motion was denied and overruled (J.R. 55). This 
appeal is upon the Judgment Roll. 
The court found, inter alia, that plaintiff presented 
its claim to the defendants in their respective capacities, 
"but did not accompany or present with said claims, or 
either of them, a copy of the written Agreement upon 
which the same was and is found or based", and "that Wil-
liam Littlejohn and E. H. Littlejo~n abandoned and ceased 
to operate the Lyric Theatre in the year 1937 (J.R. p 46). 
Also, "that more than six years prior to the commence-
ment of this action, the plaintiff elected to terminate and 
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4 
did · terminate said Agreement and more than six years 
prior to the commencement of this action, repeatedly de-
manded a return of said Phorto!ilm and equipment by the 
decedents; that nothwithstanding Sfiid termination and said 
repeated demands, as aforesaid, said Phonofilm and equip-
ment were never returned to the plaintiff." (J.R. p 46), and 
concluded that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by 
Sections 104-2-24 (2) and 104-2-22 (2) Utah Code Annotated, 
and that plaintiff's "alleged claims" are legally insufficient 
(~.R. p 48), adjudged that plaintiff recover nothing by its 
complaint from the defendants, or either of them, and ren-
dered judgment in .favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff, no cause of action. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The plaintiff contends that the court erred in: 
(1) Finding that plaintiff's claims were presented to 
the defendants without accompanying or presenting there-
V'Tith copies of the written Agreement upon which the same 
was and is founded or based. 
(2) Finding that more than six years prior to the 
commencement of the action pl1aintiff elected to terminate 
and did ter~inate said Agreement. 
(3) Concluding that plaintiff's cause or causes of 
action are barred by the Statutes of Limitations. 
(4) Concluding that the claims presented by plaintiff 
were legally insufficient. 
(5) Concluding that judgment should be for defend-
ants no cause of a·ction and that plaintiff should take noth-
ing by its complaint. 
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( 6) Concluding that defendants should be awarded 
their costs. 
(7) Granting judgment in favor of defendants and 
against the plaintiff no cause of action, and the plaintiff 
recover nothing from defendants, or either of them. 
(8) Granting judgment in favor of defendants for 
their costs. 
ARGUMENT 
First Assignment of Error 
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the trial court 
erred in finding that plaintiff's claim as presented to the 
defen~ants was not accompanied by a copy of the written 
contr~ct upon which the claim was founded, or that such 
copy was not presented with said claim. (Finding No. 14; 
J. R. p 47). The plaintiff should be sustained in its con-
tention because it alleged that the claim was duly presented 
(J.R. p 2; Par. 12) and nowhere is that allegation denied. 
On the contrary; the defendants admit in their amended an-
swer to . Paragraph 12 of plaintiff's complaint "that the 
plaintiff presented to each a purported claim in said 
estates.' (J.R. p 24). 
When plaintiff alleged that a claim was "duly pre-
sented" in each of said estates it; in effect, alleged that a 
copy of the contract upon which the claim was based was 
attached to the claim as presented. This is so bec~use the 
word "duly" implies "the existence of every ~act essential 
to perfect regularity of procedure." 19 Corpus Juris, page 
833. Since a claim, based upon a written instrument, to 
be regularly presented must be accompanied by a copy of 
such instrument, it follows that a claim regularly presented 
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instrument upon which it is founded. 
As pointed out above the defendants not only did not 
deny the proper, regular and "due" presentation of the 
claim, they admitted that plaintiff duly presented a "pur-
ported" claim. A "purported" claim is a sufficient and stat-
utory claim. State vs Burling (Iowa) 72 N W 205; Hollis-
ter v McCord et al (Wis) 87 N W 475; State vs W. S. Buck 
Mere Co (Wyo) 264 P. 1023 @ 1030; Gilchrist's Case (Eng) 
2 L,each 657 quoted in Words & Phrases Vol 35, Per Ed. p. 
542; Merrifield v Robbins et al (Mass) 8 Grey 150; Brown-
low v Wunsch (Colo) 83 P2nd 775, 781; Lacy v State (Okl) 
242 P. 296; McCraney v Glos (Ill) 78 N E 921, 923 ; Deskin 
v US Reserve Ins. Corp (Mo) 298 S W 103, 106; Regina v 
Keith, Eng. Law & Equity 558, 560, quoted in Vol.35 Words 
& Phrases Perm. Ed. p. 541. It is therefore .contended that 
no issue was raised by the defendants' amended answer to 
this allegation. The allegation being admitted, a finding 
in conflict therewith is e_rroneous and must be disregard~d. 
64 Corpus Juris, page 1259; Chase v. Van Camp Sea Food 
Co., 292 Pac. 179; Gabriel v~ Tonner, 70 Pac. 1021; Murphy 
v. Coppeiters, 68 Pac. 970; Dressler v. Johnston, 21 Pac. 
(2d) 969; De Michele v. London and Lancaster Fire Ins. 
Co., 40 U. 312, 120 Pac. 846; Peterson v. Bean, 22 U. 43, 61 
Pac. 213. 
It might have been otherwise had the defendants al-
leged in their amended answer wherein the claim was de-
fective and not what it purported to be .. It is submitted 
that this is an affirmative matter which defendants are 
required to plead. By simply admitting that plaintiff duly 
presented a purported claim defendants did not deny that 
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7 
the claim was presented, or allege that it was rrot regular 
or proper in form or was not what it purported to be. 
Second Assignment of Error 
It is also the contention of the plaintiff that the court 
erred in finding "that more than six years prior to the 
commencement of this action, the plaintiff elected to ter-
minate and did terminate said Agreement * * *". (Finding 
No. 12; J.R. p 46). 
The court erred first because the purported finding is 
not a finding of fact but a conclusion of law. For example, 
assume that a litigant was seeking an adjudication that he 
\vas no longer liable on a contract for the reason that the 
adverse party had terminated it, and alleged simply that 
the adverse party had terminated the contract, _without 
alleging the acts or conduct which, in the opinion of the 
pleader, effected such termination. This, certainly, would 
have been bad as pleading a mere conclusion of law, and 
would have raised no issue of fact. 
The writer has not been able to find any case which 
has adjudicated this question with respect to the word "ter-
mination" or "terminated", but there are numerous cases 
and text books wherein words of the same character are 
condemned as mere conclusions of law, for example, "re-
pudiated"; "abandoned"; "surrendered"; "waived"; "re-
scinded"; "released" ; "forfeited." It is submitted that the 
word "terminated" is one of the same character as those 
quoted. Therefore. the authorities would apply the same.rule 
to the word in question. 49 Corpus Juris 55, 58, 59; Pleading, 
Sections 27 and 36; Dutch Flat Water Co. v. Mooney, 12 
Cal. 534; Miller v. Modern Motor Co. of Glendale, 290 Pac. 
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122; Adams v. Hine, 268 Pac. 217; Zorn v. Livesley, 75 Pac. 
1057; Hanson v. Fidelity Mutual Benefit Corporation, 13 
Atl. (2d) 456; King v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 57 N. Y. S. 
(2d) 684. Therefore it follows that, even if defendants had 
pleaded that plaintiff "elected to terminate, and did termi-
nate said Agreement", such a plea would have been bad as 
a mere conclusion of law. Because the court adopts a 
"finding" of termination it does not change its character 
from a conclusion to a ·fact. 
Secondly, the "finding" is er:r:oneous for the reason 
that it is outside the issues raised by the ple~dings. Surely 
this' is an affirmative matter for the defendants to plead. 
Plaintiff pleaded a contract for a term of ten years from 
the dates of its execution. If the defend~nts claimed the 
contract was terminated before the expiration of the ten-
year period it was up to them to set forth the facts which 
they claimed effected such termination. But one will look 
in vain through the defendants' amended answer for even 
the allegation of the legal conclusion of termination. Being 
outside the issues raised by the pleadings the "finding" 
must be disregarded by this court on appeal. 64 Corpus 
Juris 1227, 1256-7; Kimball v. Success Mining Co., 38 Utah 
' \ 
78, 110 Pac. 872; Neuberger v. Robbins, 37 Utah 197, 106 
Pac. 933; Cole v. Gill (Cal.) 144 Pac.(2d) 25. Also, "where 
the pleading is silent regarding a material fact, the pre-
sumptions are against the pleader, and no intendment can 
be made in his favor. Thus a material fact, if not alleged, 
is presumed not to exist." 49 Corpus Juris 120. 
The case of Neuberg·er v. Robbins, supra, we believe, 
i~ determinative of the question. In that case the plaintiff 
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sued to recover the balance claimed by him to be due on 
the purchase price of 1,1421/2 bushels of wheat sold and 'de-
livered to defendant. Defendant answered that the plaintiff 
had contracted to sell 3,000 bushels of wheat to him at 64c 
per bushel; that to induce plaintiff to perform he had 
consented to an increase in the price to 68c per bushel. The 
delivery of the 1,142¥2 bushels was admitte-d, but defendant 
alleged he had been damaged by the plaintif~'s failure to 
perform in the sum of $278 and prayed judgment against 
the plaintiff for that sum. Plaintiff replied that at the 
time of modification of the contract it was agreed that he 
_was to deliver only so much wheat as he had on hand 'at 
the date of delivery. There was te'stimony on plaintiff's 
behalf that the defendant, through hi~ agent, stated that 
the quantity of wheat delivered made no difference, "just 
so we get what you have to spare. That is all we look for." 
The court made a finding to correspond to this testimony 
that "the -plaintiff * * * agreed to sell and deliver to the 
defendant so much of his said crop of wheat as he, the 
said plaintiff, could spare" and gave· judgment for plaintiff. 
In reversing the judgment the court say: 
"In his counterclaim defendant pleaded and re-
lied upon the contract as first entered into between 
himself and plaintiff, which, he alleges, was modi-
fied so as to increase the price he was to pay for 
the plaintiff's grain, but not otherwise. On the 
other hand, plaintiff, in his reply to defendant's 
counterclaim, alleged that 'an entirely new agree-
ment' was entered into 'in which plaintiff onl~ 
agreed to sell the amount of wheat he actually 
had on hand at the time.' It will thus be seen that 
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the pleadings presented the questiqn, namely, was 
the contract modified as alleged by defendant, or 
was a new contract entered into 'in which plaintiff 
agreed to sell the amount of wheat he actually 
had on hand at said time,' as pleaded by plaintiff? 
Now, the court, instead of making a finding re-
sponsive to and within this issue, found that a 
contract entirely different from either the contract 
pleaded by plain tiff or that pleaded by defendant 
had been entered in to by the parties. The find-
ing being entirely outside of the issues is there-
fore erroneous and cannot be upheld." (Emphasis 
added). So, even though there is evid~nce to sup-
port a finding, if such finding is outside the issues, 
it is "erroneous and cannot be upheld." 
Third, the court found that between the dates of No-
vember 23, 1932 and May 5, 1944, both dates inclusive, 
plaintiff wrote numerous letters, 7 4 in all, to decedents in 
each of which it demand~d payment of the $50 annual fees 
then due, and in some of said letters, between the dates 
of July 9, 1935 and March 1, 1943, both inclusive, plaintiff 
''demanded the return to it by the decedents of said Phono-
film and equipment." (Finding No. 13, J.R. pp 46-47). 
Unless these letters are calculated to have effected the 
termina;tion of "said Agreement" the trial court has made 
no conclusion respecting them. 
The contract provides, as the trial court found, (J.R. 
p 46), "that 'this license shall be- for a period of ten (10) 
years' from its date but may be soone,r terminated by the 
plaintiff upon the happening of certain events, one of which 
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is 'the failure or refusal for a period of three days to pay 
any sum or sums of money now or hereafter due, by ac-
celeration or otherwise to be paid by' the decedents 'and 
in this respect time shall be of the essence.'" (E·mphasis 
added). It must be noted that the plaintiff, alone, could 
terminate the contract prior to November 19, 1941, and 
then only upon the happening of certain events. The de-
cedents were not granted any such right of election. The 
only one of these events that has any connection with the 
case or is material to its determination, is "the failure or 
refusal for a period of three days to pay any sum or sums 
of money now or hereafter due, by acceleration or other-
wi~e." It must be borne in mind that such failure or re-
fusal did not, ipso facto, terminate the agreement, but was 
a ground upon which the plaintiff might have done so if 
it saw fit. It must be borne in mind also that plaintiff was 
not bound to terminate the agreement upon the happening 
of any of the events. 
The question which is then presented is, Did the de-
mands for payment of the annua~ license fees and _for the 
return of the equipment constitute an election to termi-
nate, and a termination of, the Agreement? To ask the 
question- is to answer it. Suppose decedents had executed 
their promissory note payable to plaintiff in annual in-
stallments over a period of ten years, and the note pro-
vided, as is frequently the case, that upon default in the 
payment of any installment the entire balance should be-
come immediately due and payable at the election of the 
holder; and that decedents defaulted after the first year 
and made no further payments. Would it be contended 
that, if plaintiff had demanded payment of the installment 
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due the second year, and each year thereafter repeated 
the demand for the total of the accrued installments, it 
would be deemed to have elec,ted to declare the entire bal-
ance due and thereby started the statute of limitations 
running against it? We think not. At no time before the 
expiration of the ten-year period did plaintiff demand pay-
ment of more than was due under the agreement at the 
time of demand. (J.lt p 47). Even if plaintiff had threat-
ened , to sue the decedents for their failure to make the 
payments when due this would not have constituted an 
election. 41 Corpus Juris 850, n 46 (b). Now here in the 
agreement is there a provision that a demand for perform-
ance shall constitute an election to terminate, and that is 
all plaintiff did by its letters. The letters of demand show 
that plaintiff regarded the contract as still in force and 
effect. "The primary object of a demand is to enable de-
fendant to perform his obl,igation or otherwise discharge 
his liability without being subjected to the , inconvenience 
and expense of litigation." 1 Corpus Juris 979. llow can 
it be said, then, that a' demand is an election to cut off the 
defendant's right or_ opportunity to perform and subject 
him forthwith to litigation? 
Fourth, as pointed out above, decedents had no right 
to terminate, the agreement. That right was reserved to 
' the plaintiff in the event decedents defaulted in certain 
particulars. (Agreement, Par. 14; J.R. p 5). The agree-
ment, also provides, as found by the court, that "upon the 
expiration or ,sooner termination of this license for any 
reason whatsoever OR the abandonment by the Exhibitor 
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of the Theatre or his eviction therefrom, the Exhibitor, 
at its own cost and expense, shall surrender and deliver up 
possession of the equipment to the Company at its factory 
... " (Emphasis added). The court also found that "Wil-
liam Littlejohn and E. H. Littlejohn (decedents) abandon-
ed and ceased to operate the Lyric Theatre in the year 
1937." (Finding No. 11; J.R. p 45-46). It is clear from 
this provision of the agreement that IF plaintiff termi-
nated the contract before its .expiration date, or IF dece-
dents abandoned the theatre,, they (decedents) were to 
return the equipment at their own expense. But by aban-
doning the theatre the decedents could not thereby effect 
a termination of the agreement. Apparently the defend-
ants and the trial court take the view that such abandon-
ment did terminate the agreement. The defendants' de-
fense is the bar of the statute of limitations. The statute 
would not run against the plaintiff unless a cause of action 
accrued. No cause of ·action accrued if the plaintiff did not 
tenninate the contract. The plaintiff did not terminate it 
as pointed out above, therefore,· defendants' defense hinges 
upon the abandonment of the theatre. 
If any such construction of the contract is indulged 
the plaintiff_ could be deprived of its property by the de-
cedents without due process of law. As an illustration, 
suppose that the equipment was very desirable to the de-
cedents. Under defendants' theory they could say to each 
other as soon as the equipment was installed, "Let's cease 
operating the theatre and the equipment. According to 
the agreement we will then be required to return the 
equipment to the Company. But, if we refuse to do this, 
and just sit by and ignore all demands for its return, the 
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Company may not take any action befiore the agreement 
expires in 1941. The Company is three thousand miles 
away and won't know what is taking place. By 1941, how-
ever, action by the company will be too late. Its cause of 
action will have arisen immediately upon our abandonment 
of the theatre and more than six years will have expired. 
Its cause of action will be barred by the statute of limita-
tions and the equipment will be ours." In this way, al-
though plaintiff has a written contract to run for a term 
of ten years, it is defeated three of four years before the 
end of that term, and its property lost by a ruse that is 
locked up in the minds of the. decedents. 
Also, such a construction would permit the decedents 
to take advantage of their own wrong. The contract was 
for ten years. The parties contemplated the operation of 
the theatre and the equipment for that term. It was wrong 
for the decedents to abandon the theatre and to cease 
operating the equipment. It was wrong for them not to 
return the equipment when they did abandon it.· And now 
their representatives set up those wrongs to defeat plain-
tiff's action brought within six years from the expiration 
date of the contract. In Page on Contracts, Second Edi .. 
tion, Vol 5, page 4649 it is stated: "If a condition is in-
serted in a contract for the benefit of one of the parties, 
the adversary party can not take advantage of a breach 
thereof." To illustrate the principle the author cites the-
provision for acceleration of maturity common in contracts 
for the payment of money, and states: "In such case the 
debtor can not take advantage of breach of such condition; 
and the period of limitations does not begin to run until 
the creditor has elected to take advantage of such breach 
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and to treat the maturity of such instrument as acceler-
ated in accordance with the provisions ·of the contract. 
(Ibid. p 4650). Lavery et al. v. Mid-Continent Oil Develop-
ment Co., 162 Pac. 737. The same principles, it is submitted, 
apply to the instant case. 
Third Assignment of Error 
It is submitted that the trial court erred in concluding 
"that the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the Statute 
of Limitations of the State of Utah and particularly Sec-
tions 104-2-24 (2) and 104-2-22 (2) of the Utah Code An-
notated, 1943." 
Section 104-2-24 (2) is the section applicable to actions 
for the "taking, detaining or injuring" of personal property. 
This section does not apply for the reason that the action 
is upon a written instrument. The period of limitatio~s 
for actions founded upon written instruments is six years. 
104-2-22 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
It is possible that, .if plaintiff had so elected, it had a 
cause of action against decedents in the year 1937 for "the 
taking, detaining or injury" to the equipment. But this 
\vould have be.en an action in tort. Plaintiff was not re-
quired to sue at that time, or to elect to terminate the 
contract. Certainly, plaintiff was not, and is not, required 
to sue in tort when it has a remedy ex contractu. In the 
case of Bowes v. Cannon et al., 116 Pac. 336 @ 339, the 
court quote with approval the case of Lightfoot v. Davis, 
91 NE 582, 584 as follows: '''though a party may have lost 
one remedy by lapse of time, it is entirely possible that 
others may be open to him.' " Also, in 37 Corpus Juris 699, 
the rule is stated as follows: "Where a party has two reme-
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dies for the enforcement of a right, the one he chooses is 
not barred by the statute of limitations, mer~ly because the 
other, if he had resorted to it, would have been." There-
fore, Section 104-2-24 (2) of the Utah Code Annotate, 1943, 
has no application. 
Plaintiff's cause of action under the contract did not 
accrue until November 19, 1941. The action was com-
menced May 24, 1945, well within the six-year period of 
limitation. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to 
conclude that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by 
Section 104-2-22 (2) of the Code. 
But the judgment should. be rev~rsed for yet another 
reason. The contract provides that "Notwithstanding any 
termination herein the Company shall be entitled to retain 
all sums received by it from the Exhibitor without preju-
dice to jts right to repossession or to recov.er any additional 
sums then or thereafter due to it from the Exhibitor and 
to any other rights at law or in equity which the Company 
may have hereunder." (Contract, Par. 14; J.R .. p 6). Ap-
parently, the trial court overlooked this provision of the 
contract, for, assuming for the purpose of argument only, 
that the plaintiff did terminate the agreemen~ more than 
six years prior to the commencement of the action, the de-
cedents were still obligated to pay to the plaintiff. the $50 
annual license fees "thereafter due it." Conceding t.hat the 
six-year period of limitations had run agains~t those annual 
license fees which weie due before May 24, 1939 (six years 
prior to the commencement of the action), plaintiff is en-
titled to recover those annual fees which became due after 
May 24, 1939. A fee of $50 was due November 19, 1939 
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and another \vas due November 19, 1940. Therefore, in any 
event, plaintiff is entitled to recover $100 with interest and 
costs. 
Fourth Assignment of Error 
In its argument upon its First Assignmnet of Error 
plaintiff points out the error of the trial court in finding 
that plaintiff "did not accompany or present with s.aid 
-
claims, or either of them, a copy of the written Agreement 
upon which the same was and is founded or based." (Find-
ing No. 14; J.R. p 48). The conclusion drawn by the court 
'that the alleged cla_ims presented by the plaintiff to the 
defendants are legally insufficient and an action will not 
lie thereon" (Conclusions of Law No. 2; J.R. p 48), is based 
upon the erroneous finding aforesaid. It therefore follows 
that, if the court erred in its finding, the conclusion based 
thereon is also erroneous. 
If the plaintiff is correct in its position respecting its 
Assignments of Error Nos. One, Two, Three and Four, it 
follows ·that it must be sustained on its remaining assign-
ments of error. 
. CONCLUSIO·N 
In conclusion, this court is confronted with a case 
where two parties entered. into a written agreement which 
expired in N ov~mber, 1941. The one party (plaintiff) fully 
performed all its obligations under the agreement; the 
other party failed to perform their obligations thereunder, 
and then plead that very failure as a defense to and actions 
brought within six years from the expiration date of the 
agreement. 
The judgment for the defendants should be reversed 
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and judgment entered in fav()r of the plaintiff for the re-
covery of the value of the equipment, to wit, $3,000.00 
with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum 
from May 24, 1945; and for the sum of $100.00 with inter-
est at the rate of six per cent per annum from November 
19, 1941, together with plaintiff's costs and disbursements 
herein expended, both in the trial court and in this court 
on appeal. 
Respectfully submitt~d, 
HAMMOND & HAMMOND, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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